A Study On Convolutional Neural Network Based End-To-End Replay
  Anti-Spoofing by Chettri, Bhusan et al.
A Study On Convolutional Neural Network Based End-To-End Replay
Anti-Spoofing
Bhusan Chettri, Saumitra Mishra, Bob L. Sturm and Emmanouil Benetos
School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science
Queen Mary University of London, United Kingdom
{b.chettri,saumitra.mishra,b.sturm,emmanouil.benetos}@qmul.ac.uk
Abstract
The second Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and
Countermeasures challenge (ASVspoof 2017) focused on “re-
play attack” detection. The best deep-learning systems to com-
pete in ASVspoof 2017 used Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) as a feature extractor. In this paper, we study their
performance in an end-to-end setting. We find that these ar-
chitectures show poor generalization in the evaluation dataset,
but find a compact architecture that shows good generalization
on the development data. We demonstrate that for this dataset
it is not easy to obtain a similar level of generalization on both
the development and evaluation data. This leads to a variety of
open questions about what the differences are in the data; why
these are more evident in an end-to-end setting; and how these
issues can be overcome by increasing the training data.
1. Introduction
The Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermea-
sures Challenge (ASVspoof) focuses on techniques to make the
automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems robust against
spoofing. Spoofing attack ‘fools’ an ASV system by using a
speech utterance that imitates the vocal characteristics of the
real speaker. The four commonly used methods to generate
spoofed speech are (1) text-to-speech; (2) voice conversion; (3)
mimicry; and (4) replay.
The second version of the challenge, referred as ASVspoof
20171, focused on text-dependent replay attack detection [1, 2].
The replay attack is a simple spoofing method that involves
recording the original speech (through a recording device, e.g.,
mobile phone) and then replaying it (through a playback de-
vice, e.g., speakers) to the biometric system. The challenge
involved building an anti-spoofing system to identify an input
speech utterance as genuine or spoofed. Building such a system
is a challenging task. One reason could be the high quality of
the replayed speech (if recorded and replayed through a high-
quality device). Moreover, the ASVspoof 2017 challenge was
particularly difficult as the challenge datasets were imbalanced
(biased towards the ‘spoofed’ class) and had a large number of
mutually exclusive spoofing configurations.
One way to design a replay attack detection system is by
hand-crafting features that capture the cues to differentiate be-
tween a genuine and a replayed signal. But, this feature extrac-
tion approach often requires domain expertise and is especially
challenging for modelling high-dimensional data (e.g., images,
audio). In another direction, researchers propose to train deep
neural network models (DNNs) to learn the desired features
1organised at Interspeech 2017
automatically from data [3]. Recent results claim that with a
‘large’ amount of training data2 and ‘enough’ computing re-
sources3, the deep models out-perform the shallow models.
Many competing systems [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] in the ASVspoof
2017 used DNN models. For example, the best systems in
the challenge [4] and [5] used deep Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN) models to learn better feature representations.
Later, the authors trained shallow classifiers (Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) and Support Vector Machine (SVM), respec-
tively) over the extracted features to discriminate between gen-
uine and spoofed recordings. The best system from [4], that is a
fusion of three models (two of which use DNNs), achieves a re-
markable performance (EER = 6.73) on the evaluation dataset.
The success of deep learning for the ASVspoof 2017 inspires
our research to analyse and understand the behaviour of these
models [9]. For example, given a trained neural network model,
we plan to visualise the features that influence its decisions. A
precursor to analyse these models is to train one that performs
‘fairly’ (better than the baseline) on the evaluation dataset.
In this work we report our experiments and challenges to
design a deep anti-spoofing system that is trained and evaluated
on ASVspoof database. We first describe our work to replicate
the state-of-the-art system [4] in an end-to-end setting. We train
an end-to-end network as it is a preliminary requirement to use
the feature visualisation and model analysis techniques from the
literature [10, 11, 12]. We found that our CNN-based model
generalises in the development dataset, but consistently under-
performs in the evaluation dataset (section 3). We later explain
our experiments to find a suitable architecture that generalises
well to the unseen data (section 4). We explored a number of
architectures, including the second best system in the challenge
[5]. But, the performance on the evaluation dataset is always
poor (EER > 26%). This raises several interesting questions
about the possible differences in the dataset and why are they
more evident in an end-to-end setting and what are the possible
ways to tackle this problem. We also propose a novel CNN ar-
chitecture for the spoofing detection task that has about 5k free
parameters.
2. Background
In this section we briefly introduce ASVspoof2017 challenge,
the spoofing dataset and some of the top performing deep-
learning systems.
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Table 1: The ASVspoof 2017 database statistics.
subset # spkrs # genuine # spoofed dur (hr)
train 10 1508 1508 2.22
dev 8 760 950 1.44
eval 24 1298 12922 11.95
2.1. The ASVspoof 2017 Challenge and the Database
The ASVspoof 2017 challenge was held as a special session
at the Interspeech 2017 conference. The challenge witnessed a
huge participation with a total of 49 submitted systems. The
first ASV spoofing challenge was held in 2015 that focused
on text independent text-to-speech and voice conversion spoof-
ing. The ASVspoof 2017 focused on text-dependent replay at-
tack detection ‘in the wild’ with varying acoustic conditions
[1]. Given a recorded speech utterance s, the main goal of the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge is to build an anti-spoofing system
that determines if s is a genuine speech.
In Table 1 we show the ASVspoof 2017 database statis-
tics. More details on the database can be found in [13]. Our
prior work in [14] reports issues found in this database. The
model predictions are highly influenced by the initial silence
frames of zeros present in the genuine signals but missing in
the spoofed counterpart. We also found that the two audio
files T 1001658.wav and T 1000150.wav do not contain any
speech recording. Therefore, we have removed them in our
study. Recently, an updated ASVspoof 2017 database version 2
has been released online4. Our work in this paper, however, is
based on the version 1 database.
In Table 2 we provide insights on how spoofed audio files
are distributed between the training and the development set. A
total of fifteen playback devices (P01-P15), sixteen recording
devices (R01-R016) and six environments (E01-E06) are used
to develop the ASVspoof 2017 replay database [2]. On the de-
velopment set we find two new environments (E01 and E03);
five new playback devices and six recording devices that do not
appear in the training set. We find three spoofing configura-
tions5 in the training set and nine in the development set. A
spoofing configuration ‘E02 P02 R04’ seems to appear in both
the training and the development set.
2.2. Published Deep-Learning Systems
We now provide a short description of the published deep-
learning systems on the ASVspoof 2017 database.
• A [4]: This system used score-level fusion of three sys-
tems. The first is a GMM trained on features extracted
from a CNN. The second is an i-vector based SVM sys-
tem trained on linear prediction cepstral coefficients and
the third system is an end-to-end CNN-RNN system.
• B [5]: They train a CNN to model spoofing configuration
on tandem features obtained by combining Constant Q
Cepstral Coefficient (CQCC) with High Frequency Cep-
stral Coefficient (HFCC). Then they use it as a feature
extractor to obtain high dimensional features on which a
2e.g., millions of images, several hundred hours of audio data
3powerful GPU’s
4https://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/3017
5Spoofing configuration refers to a unique combination of playback,
recording device and the environment where the audio is replayed
Table 2: Spoofing configuration statistics on the ASVspoof 2017
version 1 database. The number inside the bracket indicates the
number of audio files. The letters t,d,e refers to training, devel-
opment and evaluation subset. env, pd and rd denotes spoofing
environment, playback and recording device respectively.
sub # env # pd # rd # configurations
t E02(335) P02(335) R04(1508) E02 P02 R04 (335)
E05(1173) P05(1169) E05 P05 R04 (1168)
P10(4) E05 P10 R04 (4)
d E01(95) P02(95) R02(95) E02 P02 R04 (95)
E02(190) P04(95) R04(95) E05 P08 R07 (95)
E03(285) P07(95) R06(95) E05 P08 R11 (95)
E05(380) P09(95) R03(95) E03 P15 R08 (95)
P15(285) R07(190) E03 P15 R07 (95)
P08(285) R08(190) E03 P15 R11 (95)
R11(190) E05 P04 R03 (95)
E02 P07 R02 (95)
E05 P08 R08 (95)
E01 P09 R06 (95)
e meta-data not available
Table 3: Performance (EER %) of the published deep-learning
systems on the development and evaluation data.
system dev eval
A [4] 3.95 6.73
B [5] 7.6 11.5
C [6] 2.58 13.29
D [15] 3.52 16.39
E [8] 2.21 17.82
LCNNFFT [4] 4.53 7.34
binary SVM classifier is trained to discriminate genuine
and a spoofed class.
• C [6]: This system employed score-level fusion of three
systems. The first is a GMM trained on the CQCC fea-
tures. The second and third systems are residual neural
networks (ResNet) trained on the MFCC and CQCC fea-
tures respectively.
• D [15]: This system used score-level fusion of three sys-
tems. The first is a GMM system trained on CQCC fea-
tures. The second is also a GMM system but trained on
CQCC features obtained from the augmented data. The
third system is a residual neural network.
• E [8]: This system use score-level fusion of GMM
and Bi-directional long short term memory network
(BLSTM). They use their proposed Single Frequency
Filter Cepstral Coefficients (SFFCC) based delta-
features to train the GMM and BLSTM models.
• LCNNFFT [4]: This is one of the sub-system of A [4],
that use features extracted from a CNN to train a single-
component GMM to model spoofed and genuine classes.
This system has outperformed all other systems on the
evaluation data by a large margin.
In Table 3, we present the results of these systems on the de-
velopment and evaluation data. We observe a remarkable per-
formance by system A, the state-of-the-art [4]. The top two
systems (A and B) show similar-level of generalization 6on the
6the gap between the EER on the development and the evaluation
dataset is nearly the same
Figure 1: Cross entropy loss on the training and development data for four different runs of replicating the LCNNFFT of the state-
of-the-art [4]. A dropout of 70% is applied during training. We observe some consistency on the loss pattern on the development data
for different runs except the run 4.
development and the evaluation test sets which, however, con-
tradicts with performance shown by the other systems C, D and
E.
2.3. Discussion and Motivation
Usually the success of deep-learning systems is attributed to the
availability of large training data. However, within the context
of ASVspoof 2017, where the training data is significantly less
than the test data, training a deep neural network to be able to
achieve good generalization can be challenging. Therefore, we
outline following questions that motivates our research work.
1. Using only the available training and development data,
is it possible to train an end-to-end CNN that generalizes
well to the evaluation dataset (EER = 7% (approx.))?
2. Why is there inconsistency in model generalization be-
tween the development and the evaluation datasets?
Would this appear in end-to-end CNN systems too?
3. Lastly, given such a small training data, can we design a
deep architecture with as fewer trainable parameters that
neither underfits nor overfits on training data?
This work tries to seek answers to the above questions and
discusses the possible outcome. For this, we start with replicat-
ing the CNN architecture of the state-of-the-art.
3. Replicating the state-of-the-art CNN [4]
We describe our experiments in replicating the best CNN sys-
tem, LCNNFFT , of the state-of-the-art [4]. We train our CNN
using their network parameterization but, with different input
representation. We use 2048 FFT points and 2048 window size
with a hop of 10ms to compute the spectrograms. We use Li-
brosa7 library for computing the spectrograms. Therefore, our
7http://librosa.github.io
input spectrogram is 400 × 1025 (time × frequency) dimen-
sion in comparison to 400× 864 used by LCNNFFT [4]. We
envisage that use of 2048 as FFT size should not deteriorate
performance dramatically. The details of the LCNNFFT ar-
chitecture can be found in [4].
3.1. Model Training and Testing
The input to the network is a mean-variance normalized log
power magnitude spectrogram of 400 × 1025 (time × fre-
quency) dimension, where time denotes number of frames and
frequency the number of bins. We compute mean and variance
on the training data. We initialize our network weights using
Xavier initialization [16] and bias with zero. The network is
trained to optimize the cross entropy loss between a genuine
and a spoofed class. As specified in [4], we use max-feature-
map (MFM) non-linearity, learning rate of 1e-4, batch size of
32, 0.9 momentum with ADAM optimizer. However, the de-
fault parameter value of epsilon did not work and we used 0.1
for epsilon. A dropout of 70% to the inputs of the first fully con-
nected layer is used during model training. We use tensorflow
[17] framework for implementation. We used early stopping as
a terminating criterion: if the validation loss do not improve for
30 epochs then we abort the training loop. We use a maximum
of 300 training epochs and chose the model that show the best
performance on the validation data.
At inference time, for each audio spectrogram the model
outputs a posterior probability distribution for genuine and
spoofed classes. We convert the posterior probability into log
likelihoods ratio and compute the EER using the official Bosaris
toolkit [18].
Table 4: Performance (EER%) of our replicated CNNs under
two settings: end-to-end and using 1-mixture GMM trained on
CNN features. * indicates EER on the training data. System
F is trained on the development data and all other systems are
trained on the training data.
System End-to-End GMMdev eval dev eval
A 9.04 32.02 9.49 34
B 9.30 37.67 10.46 39
C 8.01 30.96 9.4 34.24
D 14.11 36.97 15.6 36.9
E 9.11 37.34 10.78 35.66
F 2.17* 38.83 na
Table 5: Performance (EER%) of our best end-to-end CNN sys-
tems on the development and evaluation data, ASVspoof 2017
database version 1. * denotes the best replicated system using
LCNNFFT .
System dev eval # params # paramsafter dropout
C * 8.01 30.96 371K 138K
Model 1 5.47 25.28 4M 600K
Model 2 4.52 34.91 68K 35K
Model 3 4.98 33.11 7682 5089
3.2. Results and Discussion
In Figure 1 we show the loss curves of our four systems (A-
D), depicting four different runs of model training. All these
systems are trained on the training data and validated on the
development data. For comparison with the state-of-the-art, we
also trained a one-component GMM on the 32-dimensional fea-
tures extracted from our trained CNNs. We present these results
in Table 4. None of our systems could achieve a performance
closer to what LCNNFFT [4] reported on the evaluation data.
Our best performing system C show an EER of 8.01% and
30.96% on the development and evaluation data under end-to-
end condition and 9.4% and 34.24% using GMMs. The perfor-
mance shown by our end-to-end models and the GMMs do not
show large difference. We further see an interesting observation
when we trained our CNN, system F, on the development data
and used training data for model validation. The model show an
impressive generalization on the training data with an EER of
about 2% but give a worse EER of 39% on the evaluation data.
Therefore these experiments suggest that it is quite difficult
to achieve the same-level of generalization between the two test
sets. In the next section we investigate new CNN architecture to
see if we can achieve same-level of generalization on both the
development and the evaluation data.
4. Investigating CNN Architectures
4.1. Model 1 [5]
Now we replicate the CNN architecture of the second best per-
forming deep-learning based system. Authors in [5] trained a
CNN on hand-crafted features (CQCC+HFCC) to model the
spoofing configuration in a multi-class setting. However, we
train this CNN using two output targets to model the genuine
and spoofed class distribution.
Inspired from [5] we chose to use first one second of audio
during training and evaluation. We use 512 point FFT, 512 win-
dow size and 10 ms hop size to produce a unified input spectro-
gram of 100 × 257 (time × frequency) dimension. Therefore,
we train our CNN on these spectrograms. The details of the
CNN architecture can be found in [5]. Since the implementa-
tion details of [5] is not disclosed in the paper, we chose to use
parameter initialization and training approach described in sec-
tion 3.1.
The performance of Model 1 is shown in Table 5. We only
report the best system we found on this architecture, which
show 5.47% and 25.28% EER on the development and evalu-
ation data. However, this system uses a high dropout rate, with
90% on the inputs of fully connected (FC) layer 1, 80% on sec-
ond FC layer, third FC layer inputs and 60% on the inputs of
the output layer.
4.2. Model 2 [19]
This CNN architecture is motivated from the work of [19] on
Birds Audio Detection (BAD) challenge 2017. Though the ob-
jective of the BAD and ASVspoof 2017 are completely differ-
ent, they exhibit some similarity in the proposed test condi-
tions: both focus on wild and diverse test conditions. There-
fore, we adapt one of their CNN architecture, ‘Bulbul’, to study
if changing architecture helps improve the gap in generalization
between the development and the evaluation data.
The details of the ‘Bulbul’ architecture can be found in [19].
We use split data, applying the algorithm described in appendix
A, during model training and testing. We use 256 point FFT, 1
seconds spectrogram window and shift window to obtain uni-
fied spectrogram of 100 × 129 dimension. At test time we
take the average of the scores obtained for different spectro-
gram parts and compute the EER. We use the parameterization
and training recipe as described in section 3.1.
We show the performance of Model 2 in Table 5. Though,
we experimented with different dropouts, we found the best re-
sult using 50% dropout on the fully connected (FC) layers in-
puts. This model give 4.52% and 34.91% EER on the develop-
ment and the evaluation data respectively. However, the gener-
alization gap between the two test sets is large.
4.3. Model 3
Our work so far have investigated different CNN architectures.
These architectures ranges from medium to large in terms of the
trainable parameters of the network. However, none of these
systems showed similar-level of generalization on the develop-
ment and evaluation data. Therefore, we now propose an archi-
tecture with smallest number of parameters that neither underfit
nor overfit on the training data. This experiment seeks answer
to our third question of section 2.3.
This architecture has three convolutional layers and two
fully connected layers. Each convolutional layer has 16 out-
put filters (feature maps) and uses a small rectangular filter of
1 × 9 with a stride of 1 × 1 along time and frequency. We ap-
ply a max-pooling operation after each convolution layer. We
use 3 × 3 kernel and 3 × 3 stride in all max-pooling layers.
We use 32 neurons in the first fully connected layer with linear
activation and two neurons in the output layer. All other layer
use max-feature-map activation. We apply 50% dropout on the
fully connected layer inputs during training. We show the archi-
tecture of model 3 in Figure 2. The input representation, model
training and testing approach we used is similar as in Model 2
of section 4.2.
8
50
Conv2 + MP2Conv1 + MP1
65
Input Spectrogram
Shape: 1 x 100 x 129
8
25
33
Conv3 + MP3
160 32 Output
FC4 FC5
Figure 2: Architecture of the proposed model. The highlighted component shows a layer and its output feature map. For example, the
shape of the feature map after the second convolutional and max pooling layer is 8×25×33 (number of channels× time× frequency).
Conv: Convolutional layer, FC: fully connected layer , MP: max pooling layer.
Table 6: EER % for different activation function.
activation dev eval
MFM 4.98 33.11
RELU 5.29 31.7
ELU 8.66 40.78
Table 7: EER% for different batch sizes.
batch size dev eval
8 4.62 36.02
16 5.64 35.35
32 4.98 33.11
64 5.96 36.6
We show the performance of Model 3 in Table 5. Our pro-
posed architecture seem to work quite well giving about 5%
EER on the development data. However, our model show a
worse generalization on the evaluation data yielding an EER
more than 30%.
5. Investigating Effect of Parameterization
5.1. Activation Function vs EER
Our work so far have used MFM activation function inspired by
the impressive results of [4]. Here, we compare the performance
of MFM with two other activations, RELU and ELU, that are of-
ten used in various deep learning tasks. We present the results in
Table 6. ELU activation show the worse performance. On the
development data, RELU and MFM seem to give similar per-
formance. However, on the evaluation data RELU outperforms
MFM and ELU.
5.2. Batch Size vs EER
All our CNN experiments so far use 32 batch size. Here, we in-
vestigate how model performance compares when the network
is trained using different batch sizes: 8, 16 and 64. We present
the results in Table 7. We see worse performance on both the
development and evaluation data for 64 batch size. Similarly,
batch size 16 does not seem to work well. Overall, we see an
optimal performance for batch size of 32.
Table 8: EER % using split spectrograms and single spectro-
gram.
spectrogram dev eval
split 4.98 33.11
single 6.5 35.56
5.3. Split Data vs EER
Our work explored utterance representation either by a sin-
gle spectrogram or multiple splits using the approach de-
scribed in appendix A, for training the CNNs. Here, we com-
pare the performance of these two representation. For single-
spectrogram representation, we use three seconds audio (trun-
cating/appending the original audio samples) to obtain 300 ×
129 dimension spectrogram. Using split approach we obtain
spectrograms of 100× 129 dimension. For split, we chose one
seconds spectrogram window and spectrogram shift. We used
256 point FFT in both cases. We show the results in Table 8.
The model trained on split spectrograms outperforms single-
spectrogram representation model on both the development and
evaluation data.
6. Summary and conclusion
In this work, we discussed the ASVspoof challenge and its sec-
ond edition (ASVspoof 2017) that focused on the replay attack
detection. We described the best-performing systems from the
challenge which were based on deep learning. We presented our
motivation to implement an end-to-end model for the ASVspoof
2017 challenge and reported our experiments to implement one.
In our experiments, we explored four end-to-end deep CNN
architectures to design a replay attack detection system. We
started with the state-of-the-art systems from the challenge, and
later proposed a novel light-weight architecture. In all our ex-
periments the trained models failed to generalise in the evalua-
tion dataset but achieved good performance in the development
dataset. This intriguing result raises several interesting ques-
tions: why is it challenging to find an architecture that gener-
alises in the evaluation dataset, how different are the data distri-
butions between the subsets of the ASVspoof database.
Our current work does not use the newly patched ASVspoof
2017 database version 2. All our study is based on the version
1. We plan to use the new database for our future work that in-
volves analysing the proposed model (Model 3) to understand
what the model has learned about the genuine and spoofed sig-
nal. We aim to generate explanations for individual model pre-
dictions. Such an analysis will provide insight into the features
maximally influencing a prediction.
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A. Data Split: Increasing the Data Points
We propose a very simple technique that helps increase training
data. We call this approach as ‘split data’. Using this approach
we can generate large amount of training data points. Given an
audio utterance s, we outline the algorithm for generating data
points below.
1. Let l = length(s), be the original duration of s.
2. Update s by duplicating/truncating the samples such that
lnew = ceil(l).
3. Compute the log power magnitude spectrogram: D =
log|STFT (s)|2, where, D matrix has T number of
frames and F frequency bins.
4. Let specwind and windshift be the desired window and
shift size (in time) respectively. Now, split D into parts
by moving specwind by windshift.
5. Return the list of spectrograms generated in step 4,
where each spectrogram is of dimension specwind x F.
